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1.  Introduction 
 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle notes a number of bad character traits, or 
phaulotêtes (singular phaulotês), indicative of a poorly developed character (or êthos).  
These phaulotêtes include spite, shamelessness and envy.
1
  However Aristotle was 
interested in emotions, and their connection with character, long before he formally 
embedded them in his ethical theory.  It is already clearly visible in his early treatise 
The Art of Rhetoric.  In this chapter I explore this connection. 
In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that an orator, in trying to persuade an 
audience, has three modes of persuasion available to him: logical argument (logos), 
the speaker’s own character (êthos), and “putting the hearer into a certain frame of 
mind” (1.2.1356a1-4: ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως).2  He elaborates: “[The 
orator persuades] through his hearers, when they are led to emotion by his speech” 
(1.2.1356a14-15: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου 
προαχθῶσιν).  The third mode of persuasion is thus emotion (pathos),3 which can 




Aristotle discusses emotions in Book 2 of the Rhetoric, defining them as feelings that 
affect judgment and are accompanied by pain and pleasure (2.1.1378a19-21: ἔστι δὲ 
τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα µεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ 
                                                 
1
 NE 2.6.1107a9-11: ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόµασται συνειληµµένα µετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον 
ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος; others include incontinence and prodigality (NE 4.1.1119b31-
32), and the generic “vice” (kakia – NE 7.6.1150a1-5). 
2
 All references in this chapter are to Arist. Rhet. unless otherwise stated.  All translations are my own, 
unless otherwise specified. 
3
 Leighton 1996, 223-30 shows that, while Aristotle generally (e.g. NE 2.5.1105b21-23) includes both 
emotions and epithymia (appetite – e.g. hunger, thirst, sex drive) within pathê, in the Rhetoric he 
excludes epithymia.  Leighton argues convincingly this is because Aristotle is only interested here in 
pathê that affect judgment (i.e. emotions), and appetites do not do so, or at least not cognitively – 
Viano 2003, 94 agrees; see also Grimaldi 1988, 14-5.  Several other pathê mentioned at 
NE 2.5.1105b21-23 (confidence, joy, longing) are also not included in the Rhetoric, probably because 
Aristotle did not believe they affected judgment either.  Aristotle himself notes in the Rhetoric that he 
has discussed the pathê that relate to persuasive argument (2.11.1388b29-30). 
4
 Rhet. 1.2 appears to contradict 1.1, in which Aristotle said that “slander, pity, anger and such 
emotions of the soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror” 
(1.1.1354a16-18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ 
πράγµατός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν), and again “one should not lead the juror into anger, 
envy or pity – it is like warping a carpenter’s rule” (1.1.1354a24-26: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν 
διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον·  ὅµοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ µέλλει χρῆσθαι 
κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν.).  Dow 2007 is persuasive on how to resolve this contraction; see 
also Fortenbaugh 1979, 147, Grimaldi 1980, 9-11, Wisse 1989, 17-20, Cooper 1994, 194-6, and Barnes 
1995, 262.  Whatever the tensions, it is clear from the rest of the Rhetoric that Aristotle did see a role 
for pathos in persuading an audience, so his comments in 1.1 need not detain us unduly. 
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ἡδονή).5  This definition sees emotions as cognitive:6 we perceive something 
(consciously or subconsciously, through any of our senses); that perception makes us 
feel something; and this feeling alters our judgment, which in turn can affect our 
actions.
7
  In Rhet. 2.2-11, Aristotle analyses fifteen named (and several unnamed) 
emotions, stating the general psychological condition under which each arises, and 
who might feel each emotion, for whom, and in what circumstances.  Of these 
emotions, phthonos (envy) is uniquely identified as bad (phaulon),
8
 and in this 
Aristotle notes a truism of Greek culture.
9
 
While there has been much recent scholarship on the Rhetoric,
10
 excepting Grimaldi’s 
commentary on Book 2 this has tended until recently to treat Aristotle’s account of the 
emotions as a whole (or at best successively, with minimal commentary on each 
individual emotion).  One notable exception is David Konstan’s ‘Aristotle on Anger 
and the Emotions: the Strategies of Status’.
11
  Aristotle believed anger to be 
appropriate in certain situations, and only morally problematic in excess.  This is 
axiomatic to his approach to the emotions, and explains why for him they are an 
acceptable tool in oratory.  However phthonos (envy), because of its moral badness, 
creates issues for Aristotle’s theory not pertinent to other emotions. 
In this chapter I shall explore these.  I start by showing how Aristotle argues in the 
Rhetoric that bad (phaulos) character is a crucial criterion for distinguishing phthonos 
within the group of emotions relating to others’ good or bad fortune.  This distinction 
survives the intellectual shift to the “doctrine of the mean” in the Nichomachean 
Ethics, but there phthonos becomes a paradigm of badness (kakos) in which an 
ethically uneducated person feels excessively the otherwise acceptable emotion 
nemesis (indignation).  I explain how Aristotle’s ethical training can remove badness 
from one’s character, showing that such training stops one feeling phthonos but still 
allows other (good) emotions pertaining to others’ fortunes.  Finally, returning to the 
Rhetoric, I demonstrate how phthonos’ badness creates problems for the use to which 
Aristotle would like to put emotions in rhetoric – namely, affecting an audience’s 
                                                 
5
 Frede 1996 discusses whether each emotion involves both pain and pleasure (pleasure in anticipating 
an action to alleviate pain), or just one or the other.  She argues Aristotle tends towards the former view 
in Rhet. Book 1, and the latter in Book 2. 
6
 Aristotle was the first scholar to highlight the role of cognition in emotion, an approach that has 
gained much currency in the last thirty years, decreasing emphasis on physiological explanations – see 
Konstan 2006, 7-27 for a discussion of modern approaches to the emotions. 
7
 While Greeks had long understood the role of emotion in decision making, it was Aristotle who first 
presented it as a normal phenomenon, and not inherently problematic; c.f. Grimaldi 1988, 12. 
8
 For instance, Aristotle says that pity and indignation are both good (2.9.1386b11-12: καὶ ἄµφω τὰ 
πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ), as is emulation, while phthonos is bad (2.11.1388a35-36: διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν 
ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων).  Phthonos covers the English emotion 
envy (a “bottom-up” feeling, against someone who has something we lack), but can also translate 
possessive jealousy (a “top-down” feeling, against someone who lacks something we have), malice, ill-
will or grudging (LSJ) – c.f. Walcot 1978, 22; Cairns 2003, 239.  Smith, Kim and Parrott 1988 suggest 
that in English, “envy” is rooted in some form of social comparison, while “jealousy” is broader and 
often linked to romantic situations.  They associate jealousy with such affective states as 
suspiciousness, rejection, hurt, and fear of loss, while envy is associated with such feelings as longing, 
inferiority, self-awareness, and a motivation to improve. 
9
 Phthonos is in fact such a damning character trait that, while it appears occasionally in high-minded 
moralising, regularly in accusation, and above all in denial (οὐ φθονῶ), it is almost never claimed for 
oneself – Eur. Bacch. 820, spoken by the crazed Pentheus, is a rare exception. 
10
 E.g. Grimaldi 1980 and 1988; Furley and Nehamas 1994; Garver 1994; Rorty 1996; Gross and 
Walzer 2000. 
11
 Konstan 2003.  More recently, Konstan 2006 examines in significant detail the philological 
phenomenology of most of the emotions treated in Rhet., comparing them with literary use. 
Page 3 of 20 
judgement – and I explore alternative uses an Aristotelian orator might make of the 
Rhetoric’s chapter on phthonos. 
 
 
2.  The placement of phthonos in the Rhetoric 
 
2.1  Pain and pleasure at the fortunes of others 
Aristotle generally treats the emotions in named pairs – anger and calmness, 
friendship and hate, etc.  However, he treats as a group emotions (some unnamed) 
relating to the fortunes of others.  In Rhet. 2.8 he begins with eleos (pity), which he 
describes as pain at someone’s undeserved bad fortune (1385b13-14: ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος 
λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινοµένῳ κακῷ ...  τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν).12  In 2.9, Aristotle 
discusses the relationship between pity and a number of other emotions.  He begins by 
stating that to nemesan (indignation) lies most opposed to pity in being pain at 
someone’s undeserved good fortune, both emotions being felt by someone of good 
character (1386b8-12: ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν µάλιστα µὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεµεσᾶν· τῷ 
γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείµενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ 
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις.  καὶ ἄµφω τὰ 
πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ).  Phthonos (envy) appears to be similarly opposed to pity, and 
perhaps even the same thing as indignation, but in fact it is a pain excited by the 
perceived good fortune, not of someone undeserving, but of those like us 
(2.9.1386b16-20: δόχειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι 
τρόπον, ὡς  σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεµεσᾶν, ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον·  λύπη µὲν γὰρ 
ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
ἴσου καὶ ὁµοίου).13  He goes on to say that these feelings will be accompanied by 
their opposite emotions (2.9.1386b25-26: φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ 
ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις),14 which will be pleasurable or at least not painful 
(2.9.1386b27: ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται).15  Finally, in 2.11, Aristotle discusses 
zêlos (emulation).  This is, like envy, a pain at someone else’s good fortune 
(2.11.1388a32-33: εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινοµένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν 
ἐντίµνω), though not because they have something, but because we do not: emulation 
(as Aristotle parenthetically explains) is a good emotion felt by good people, whereas 
envy is a bad emotion felt by bad people; emulation makes us act to acquire goods 
ourselves, envy to deprive someone else of them (2.11.1388a34-38: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ 
ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ ἔστιν (διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ 
                                                 
12
 Aristotle goes on to say that we must believe we could suffer the same bad fortune in order to pity, 
though this aspect of pity is irrelevant here. 
13
 Konstan 2006, 111-28 disagrees with Aristotle’s rigid separation of to nemesan and phthonos, 
arguing that nemesis had largely died out by the Classical period, with phthonos, rarely used in the 
Archaic period, replacing it to imply retributive indignation (among its other meanings); Aristotle 
resurrected nemesis (or to nemesan as he calls it in the Rhet.) for his didactic purposes. 
14
 Aristotle clarifies “accompanied”, saying that the type of person who feels indignation is the same 
type of person who feels its opposite in a contrary situation (not that each individual episode of 
indignation will be accompanied by its opposite). 
15
 Aristotle often finds his desire to schematise restrictive.  Here, for instance, if something is opposite 
to painful, it should be pleasurable, but in some situations might not be.  For instance, any good person 
will be pained by a criminal escaping justice, but one’s response to a convicted murderer being hanged 
will depend partly on one’s attitude to the death penalty.  Aristotle is aware of this difficulty, and gets 
round it by saying that if one does not feel pleasure, one at least will not feel pain.  A modern ethicist 
might disagree, arguing that such a situation tests one’s opposition to the death penalty. 
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φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων·  ὁ µὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον 
τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον µὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον)).16  The 
opposite of emulation is kataphronêsis (disdain) (2.11.1388b22-3: ἐναντίον γὰρ 
ζήλῳ καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν).17 
This collection of emotions, and their relationship to each other, is on first reading 
rather bewildering.  Aaron Ben-Ze’ev has proposed a categorisation based on two 
factors: whether the subject is better or worse off than the object; and whether the 
situation is deserved.
18
  Ben-Ze’ev maps his reading of Aristotle as in Fig. 1. 
 
 
  Fig. 1:  Source: Ben-Ze’ev 2003, 104 
 
As Ben-Ze’ev shows, pity is an emotion triggered by seeing someone worse off in an 
undeserved situation, while indignation, envy and emulation are all emotions 
                                                 
16
 I do not see why a bad person might not emulate another bad person (e.g. a mugger emulating a bank 
robber), but Aristotle does not seem to envisage this possibility.  Perhaps his desire to schematise, to 
present emotions as either “good” or “bad”, has led him to ignore such situations. 
17
 Kataphronêsis is difficult to translate, as no English word does it full justice.  Barnes 1984 uses 
“contempt”, but this does not capture the self-satisfaction and desire to avoid similar misfortune 
implied by Aristotle.  I believe “disdain” does so better, but these aspects should be borne in mind 
wherever “disdain” occurs below. 
18
 Ben-Ze’ev 2003, 102-4.  He notes that Aristotle likewise ignores other determinants of emotional 
response, such as culture (i.e. whether an emotion was acceptable and how intensely it was felt).  I 
would add individual personality traits to the list: some people are more disposed to a particular 
emotional response than others – however we should note that Aristotle is interested in mass audiences, 
and while intensity of response might differ across an audience, one would expect some sort of normal 
distribution centred on the effect Aristotle predicts, with crowd mentality doing the rest. 
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triggered by seeing someone better off in an undeserved situation.
19
  These emotions 
lie across an axis from, and so are opposed to (antikeisthai), pity.  We cannot believe 
someone to be simultaneously better-off and worse-off than ourselves in relation to 
some desert, which is why Aristotle argues that if you envy or are indignant at 
someone, you cannot pity them.
20
  Emotions in the top left quadrant are also directed 
at someone worse off than ourselves, like pity, but they differ in being felt in a 
deserved situation.  They are also therefore opposed (antikeisthai) to pity, if in a 
different way to indignation, envy and emulation, and similarly cannot co-exist with 
it.  Emotions in diagonally opposite quadrants are true contraries (enantia), opposed 
both in the subject-object relation and in the deservingness of the situation.
21
  A 
painful emotion felt in an undeserved situation is indeed most directly contrary to a 
pleasurable emotion felt in a deserved situation, and again one cannot feel both sorts 
of emotion for the same person simultaneously.  We can also note with Ben-Ze’ev 




Ben-Ze’ev’s diagrammatic representation is very useful, but in a number of points it 
does not reflect Aristotle.  First, it should not include either admiration or compassion: 
Ben-Ze’ev has been influenced by his own research as a philosopher into reading 
these without warrant in Aristotle’s discussion.
23
  Second, Ben-Ze’ev has ignored 
disdain, which clearly should be on the map somewhere, and probably (since it is 
enantion to emulation) in the top left quadrant.  Third, Ben-Ze’ev has included spite, 
but his evidence for this emotion comes from the Nicomachean Ethics and, as I will 
show, these treatises cannot simply supplement each other.  Finally, I believe he has 
misplaced some of his emotions, partly because his analysis does not take account of 
something crucial: character. 
 
2.2  A three-way categorisation 
 
To go back a stage, Aristotle discusses three emotions in the Rhetoric that are pains 
we (the subject) feel on perceiving that someone else (the object) has some good.  
                                                 
19
 Note it is the entire situation (including our lack of goods) that we perceive as undeserved, not 
necessarily the object’s possession of goods – this allows emulation to appear in this quadrant, though 
(as I argue below) deservingness is still not that important to emulation. 
20
 2.9.1387a3-5; 2.9.1387b17-21; 2.10.1388a27-30.  We could of course believe them better-off and 
worse-off for different deserts, e.g. I could envy someone’s wealth but also pity them for having 
cancer.  However at any instant one emotion or the other would predominate, depending on which 
thought was uppermost. 
21
 Arist. Categ. 10 notes that there are four ways in which something can be opposed (antikeisthai): as 
relatives (ta pros ti – e.g. double and half); as contraries (ta enantia – e.g. good and bad; black and 
white); as privation and state (sterêsis kai hexis – e.g. blindness and sight); as affirmation and negation 
(kataphasis kai apophasis – e.g. he is sitting, and he is not sitting).  Meta. 4.10.1018a25 notes that 
contraries are the most strongly opposed. 
22
 Ben-Ze’ev 2003, 103. 
23
 Ben-Ze’ev 2000 discusses a number of emotions felt at others’ fortunes which do not occur in 
Aristotle, and his binary categorisation comes from this work and is imposed onto Aristotle.  In general 
it works quite well.  Ben-Ze’ev 2003, 113, however, believes Aristotle’s discussion of kindness in 2.7 
is the same as our compassion – Konstan 2006, 156-68 argues, in my view correctly, that the emotion 
Aristotle treats is not kharis (kindness), but kharin ekhein (gratitude) – but Aristotle does not relate this 
emotion to any of those in 2.8-11.  Similarly, Aristotle’s comments on admiration quoted by Ben-Ze’ev 
2003, 118 are that we emulate those we admire (2.11.1388b20), which does not amount to another 
emotion, merely a descriptive verb applied to the emulator.  Ben-Ze’ev goes on to argue “that 
admiration, rather than emulation, is the opposite of contempt” (118), and proceeds to put admiration in 
a different quadrant from emulation; none of this is justified by Aristotle’s text. 
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These emotions are indignation, envy and emulation, and in a number of short 
passages Aristotle tells us how to distinguish them.
24
  We feel indignation because the 
other person does not deserve the good (1386b10-11: τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις 
εὐπραγίαις), but this is explicitly contrasted with envy, where it is not a concern 
(2.9.1386b18-20: λύπη µὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁµοίου), nor is the other’s deservingness 
mentioned in connection with emulation.  We feel emulation because we want the 
same good as someone else, though we have no desire to deprive them of theirs 
(2.11.1388a34-37: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ ἔστιν ...·  ὁ µὲν γὰρ 
αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν), but in both 
indignation and envy our concern is with someone else owning the good, not with our 
own lack (2.9.1386b20-21: τὸ δὲ µὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συµβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ 
αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁµοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν; 2.11.1388a37-38: ὁ δὲ τὸν 
πλησίον µὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον).  Finally, Aristotle states it is bad to feel envy,25 
but good to feel emulation (2.11.1388a35-36: διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ 
ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων), and indignation is also associated 
with good character (2.9.1386b11-12: καὶ ἄµφω τὰ πάθη [to eleein and to nemesan] 
ἤθους χρηστοῦ; 2.9.1386b33-1387a1: καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα 
[to nemesan and others (see below)], τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός 
ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός).26  We can see, therefore, that Aristotle describes 
how these emotions differ from each other by reference to three, not two, factors: 
whether the subject’s character is good or bad; whether the object’s deservingness is 
important; and whether the good itself is specifically desired.  Each factor shows one 
emotion differing markedly from the other two.
27
 
Turning to pleasurable emotions at someone else’s bad fortune, Aristotle has provided 
one, disdain, and stated that it is the opposite of emulation (2.11.1388b22-23: 
ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν): if we 
emulate those who have certain goods, we disdain those who do not; if we wish to 
copy someone in achieving something positive, we do not wish to copy them in 
achieving something negative (2.11.1388b23-26: ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας 
ὥστε ζηλῶσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ 
                                                 
24
 He characterises each emotion according to who feels it, when, and against whom (2.1.1378a23-26); 
but this is not how he distinguishes one emotion from another. 
25
 It is perhaps odd that Aristotle does not mention envy’s badness in the chapter he nominally devotes 
to that emotion (2.10).  However, its badness is irrelevant to the “Who feels it? When? Against 
whom?” questions that are the main focus of each chapter; the point most logically belongs where he 
compares one emotion with another.  He has already told us at 2.9.1386b33-1837a1 that the phthoneros 
(and the epikhairekakos) is of a contrary character to the khrêstos who feels indignation (and various 
other emotions), so it would be unnecessary to repeat it until he compares phthonos with another 
emotion, which he does not do till 2.11.1388a34-38 (after which follow a number of situations 
inspiring zêlos that contrast directly with individual situations inspiring phthonos – see note 49 below).  
In the NE too, envy is one of only a handful of bad emotions, along with spite and shamelessness 
(NE 2.6.1107a9-11).  These remarks are all consistent, so we should not take the absence of a statement 
of envy’s badness in 2.10 as problematic. 
26
 Grimaldi 1988, 56 cites Vahlen, J., Beiträge zu Aristoteles’ Poetik.  Berlin 1914, 266-8, on “the 
similarity, if not the identity, in the Poetics of ἐπιεικής, χρῆστος (sic), σπουδαῖος to denote the 
morally good”.  Bonitz 1870, 813b37-8 notes that epieikês and khrêstos are opposite to phaulos. 
27
 We should note that Aristotle is not overly interested in mixed motives here, but presumably one can 
feel both indignation and emulation simultaneously, if one both wants what someone else has and 
thinks the other person shouldn’t have it.  However, since one cannot be both morally good and 
morally bad, for Aristotle feeling envy precludes feeling either of the other two emotions as well 
(though see note 16 above). 
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τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν).28  Just as in 
emulation we feel a pain at not having the same goods as someone else, so in disdain 
we feel pleasure that we are not suffering such evils ourselves, what Grimaldi calls 
“the pleasure which comes with self-satisfaction”.
29
 
The opposites of indignation and envy are more complicated, not least because it is 
not immediately clear whether there are two feelings or one.  Having compared 
indignation with envy (see above), Aristotle goes on to talk about the opposite 
emotions accompanying the ones to which he has just referred, and I quote the 
passage in full for clarity: 
 
φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις·  ὁ µὲν γὰρ 
λυπούµενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται 
ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ 
µιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιµωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ 
χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατ’ 
ἀξίαν· ἄµφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ·  ἀνάγκη γὰρ 
ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁµοίῳ, καὶ αὑτῷ. καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν 
ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ’ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνοµένῳ καὶ 
ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου 
χαίρειν·  (2.9.1386b25-1387a3). 
 
And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones (toutois).  For 
whoever is pained by someone suffering bad fortune undeservedly, will be 
pleased or at least not pained by those who suffer bad fortune oppositely 
[i.e. deservedly]. For instance, no good person (khrêstos) would be pained at 
parricides or murderers being punished; one must rejoice at such things, just 
as at people having good fortune deservedly.  For both things are just, and 
make the good person (epieikê) rejoice, since he must expect the same thing 
to happen to him as to someone like him.  And all these emotions are felt by 
the same character (êthous); and contrary feelings are felt by the contrary 
character: for the same person is spiteful (epikhairekakos) and envious 
(phthoneros), as someone pained by something’s existence or genesis will 
necessarily rejoice at its absence or destruction. 
 
Where Aristotle says “And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones”, 
he initially appears to be talking about indignation and envy, the emotions he has been 
contrasting in the immediately preceding paragraph.  In fact, in the following 
sentence, Aristotle talks about being pained by undeserved misfortune, which is not 
indignation but pity.  Toutois therefore refers to all the emotions so far discussed, pity 




First, Aristotle says that the man pained by undeserved misfortune (i.e. the person 
who feels pity), already identified with the person who feels indignation, will also feel 
joy at deserved misfortune (2.9.1386b26-28 and 30) and deserved good fortune 
                                                 
28
 Aristotle goes on to say that we can also feel kataphronêsis for those with good fortune, when it does 
not come with the right sort of goods (2.11.1388b26-28: διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν 
εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίµων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη) – equivalent, in the 
modern world, to our contemptuous feeling for those we know will squander their lottery winnings, or 
for the nouveaux riches who buy vulgar status symbols. 
29
 Grimaldi 1988, 179. 
30
 ibid. 155. 
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(2.9.1386b30-31).
31
  We therefore have four emotions: pity; indignation; pleasure at 
deserved misfortune (a sort of satisfaction at someone getting their “come-uppance”); 
and pleasure at deserved good fortune (for which I shall use Ben-Ze’ev’s ‘happy 
for’).
32
  All these emotions will be felt by people of the same – i.e. epieikes 
(2.9.1386b32) or êthous khrêstou (2.9.1386b11-12) – character, people who can 
diagnose others’ deserts correctly and feel appropriate pain or joy.  Aristotle goes on 
to state that contrary feelings will be felt by the contrary – i.e. phaulos – character: 
that the phthoneros (the envious man) is also epikhairekakos (spiteful).  Aristotle says 
later that this joy is roused similarly to envy (2.10.1388a24-27: δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς 
χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, 
οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται), which must mean: by the 
misfortunes of equals, rather than the deserving.  This is appropriate, as someone 
morally bad will be unable to diagnose deserts correctly.  He will feel envy and spite 
whether the object deserves it or not.
33
 
Ben-Ze’ev’s diagram would therefore be more in tune with Aristotle’s thinking if it 
looked something like Fig. 2.  There are three pleasurable emotions – pleasure at 
deserved misfortune, spite and disdain – respectively opposite to indignation, envy 
and emulation.  Pity also has an opposite: ‘happy for’.  Each pair of emotions is 
aroused in the same individual in directly contrary circumstances, which is why each 
emotion is linked to its direct opposite. 
 
   
  Fig. 2:  Revised diagram of emotions relating to others’ fortunes 
 
                                                 
31
 Cf. 2.9.1387b16-18; see Cooper 1996, 242, who draws attention to this unnamed good contrary to 
indignation. 
32
 Ben-Ze’ev 2003, 118. 
33
 Aristotle has devoted almost the entirety of one chapter to each painful emotion, with no more than a 
few lines for each contrary pleasurable emotion (c.f. Ben-Ze’ev 2003, 103), a scanty treatment 
similarly applied to shamelessness (2.6.1385a14-15) and ingratitude (2.7.1385b7-10). 
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I would mention three qualifications to this diagram.  First, I am following Ben-Ze’ev 
in excluding a character axis (coming out from / going into the page), though for 
clarity rather than oversight – it is this that makes envy and spite appear close to the 
centre, since (bad) character is the only significant factor in these emotions.  Second, 
emotions will not always be felt to the same degree, so a response will be somewhere 
along a line rather than at a fixed point.  Finally, the exact emotional response will 
vary between individuals and in different situations, so each emotion could perhaps 
best be represented by a teardrop centred on the origin, the line being an average 
response.  While this representation is therefore not quite perfect, I believe its extra 
clarity makes up for these minor imperfections, so long as they are borne in mind.  






3.  The placement of phthonos in the Ethics 
 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle appears to argue that there are only two types of character 
(êthos): good (epieikes or khrêstos) and bad (phaulon).  The former can feel a number 
of emotions related to others’ fortunes (pity and ‘happy for’, indignation and ‘pleasure 
at deserved misfortune’, emulation and disdain); the latter only envy and spite, 
depending whether the fortune is bad or good.  Good people cannot feel envy and 
spite at all; bad people can feel nothing else.  If this were true, an orator’s audience 
could consist only of people whose characters were either good or bad.  People whose 
characters were somewhere in the middle, or who were sometimes good and 
sometimes bad, would not be envisaged.  Anticipating slightly the Ethics, where 
Aristotle argues that to be morally virtuous requires an ethical education, this would 
imply that those without such moral virtue (i.e. virtually everyone) are bad.
35
  Is 
Aristotle really arguing that the vast majority of his orator’s audience will be morally 
bad individuals, capable of feeling only envy and spite?  It seems inherently unlikely.  
If nothing else, why would Aristotle then devote 186 lines to good people (66 lines to 
pity, 82 to indignation and 38 to emulation) and only 44 to bad (envy)?
36
  Indeed, if 
the vast majority of the audience could only feel envy and spite, why even bother 
teaching an orator about pity and indignation?  Such an interpretation would place 
Aristotle at odds with oratorical practice, where appeals to an audience’s pity and 
indignation (or righteous anger) are commonplace.
37
 
                                                 
34
 See notes 15, 16 and 27 above. 
35
 We should note that there are two ways in which the terms good (epieikês or khrêstos) and bad 
(phaulos) can be used: morally and socially.  For an Archaic aristocrat such as Theognis, the two 
senses are identical, “the good” being synonymous with aristocracy and “the base” with commoners.  
In democratic Athens, with its strong demotic ideology, the two become separated, so Euripides can 
talk about an honest poor man (phaulon khrêston), contrasted with a bad cleverer one (kakon 
sophôteron) – Ion 834-5.  While Aristotle’s aristocratic audience in his Ethics lectures might well think 
of themselves as both socially and morally good, for Aristotle himself these two senses are not 
identical; though it should be noted that to become morally good (through studying ethics), social 
“goodness” (i.e. wealth and leisure) would be a pre-requisite – Hutchinson 1995, 203; Nussbaum 1994, 
55-6.  It is possible Aristotle adopts a lower standard of “goodness” for the mass audience his orator (in 
the Rhetoric) will address, but there is no reason to suppose this is necessarily so. 
36
 Lines as per the Oxford Classical Text. 
37
 Carey 1996, 402-5 discusses righteous anger and pity, among other emotions roused; Dover 1974, 
195-6 notes that orators often attempted to rouse a jury’s pity, sometimes by bringing their children 
into court; Allen 2003, 80-6 argues that juries were roused to controlled righteous anger (orgê), in an 
amount appropriate to the crime, an emotion Aristotle separates off as to nemesan; Webb 1997, 120-5 
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However, the Greek words phaulos, epieikês and khrêstos are much more flexible, 
and have a broader application both socially and morally (see note 35 above), than the 
English words “bad” and “good”, and in both interpretations (social and moral) 
moving from one to the other is possible.  We should instead perhaps translate these 
words, in this context, as “characteristic of moral goodness” and “characteristic of 
moral badness”, which is suggestive of a continuum.
38
  Aristotle does not believe 
most people are uniformly bad or uniformly good but somewhere in the middle.
39
  
Most people’s characters have been partially educated, partially encouraged towards 
moral goodness (I discuss how in section 4.2 below).  Much of the time people will 
not feel emotions that are either phaulon or epieikes.  There will be instances where 
they feel one or the other, but with no reliability, and it is the orator’s job to try to tug 
them towards one end of the spectrum or the other, to try to awake an indignant or 
envious emotional response by appealing to their moral education or lack of it. 
Aristotle (unlike the Stoics) does not believe that emotions are inimical to reason, and 
should therefore be eliminated as far as possible.
40
  In the Nicomachean Ethics, he 
argues that a proper measure of emotion is the morally desirable response, and he 
calls that proper measure the mean (mesotês); he goes so far as to define virtue in 
relation to feeling appropriate emotion.
41
  However, one might not feel the proper 
amount of emotion: one might feel an excess or a deficiency (both are opposed to the 
mean and to each other), and both these extremes are vices (NE 2.6.1107a2-3: 
µεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς µὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν; 
2.8.1108b11-12: τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο µὲν κακιῶν, τῆς µὲν καθ’ 
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν, µιᾶς δ’ ἀρετῆς τῆς µεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις 
ἀντίκεινταί πως).  For example: feeling a lack of fear when proper (the mean) is 
bravery, a virtue; feeling a lack of fear even when one should feel fear (the excessive 
vice) is rashness; feeling fear too often (the defective vice) is cowardice 
(NE 3.7.1115b11-1116a9).  Aristotle argues (NE 2.6.1106a25-1106b3) that the 
location of the mean will vary, not just from situation to situation, but from person to 
person.  For instance, if eating two measures of food would be too little for all and ten 
too much, the right amount (the mean) will not necessarily be six measures: this 
would be too little for a champion athlete, but too much for a beginner.  Thus six 
measures might be an excess, a deficiency, or a mean.  Means are therefore relative to 
us, not to the object.  It is for this reason that a proper emotional response might be 
part-way along a line in Fig. 2, rather than at the line’s end. 
In the Eudemian Ethics, nemesis is a mean, and covers four emotions: pain at 
undeserved good or bad fortune (indignation and pity), and pleasure at deserved good 
or bad fortune (‘happy for’ and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’).
42
  The excessive 
vice is phthonos, which is described as a pain felt at deserved good fortune (envy); the 
defective vice is unnamed, but is felt by the epikhairekakos, and is a joy at undeserved 
                                                                                                                                            
shows that Roman oratory likewise attempted to arouse misericordia (pity) and indignatio 
(indignation). 
38
 As these formulations are clumsy in English, I shall continue using the designations “bad” and 
“good”, but the broader interpretation should be borne in mind. 
39
 Broadie 1991, 102. 
40
 Nussbaum 1994, 9-10, 41-2; Gill 2003, 29; Knuuttila 2004, 6. 
41
 As Nussbaum 1996, 316-7 points out, this means that even a correct action is not virtuous unless it 
has been motivated by morally appropriate emotions. 
42
 While this definition is idiosyncratic (to say the least), these are the same four emotions that Aristotle 
treats together at Rhet. 2.9.1386b25-33 where he argues they are all the product of the same good 
character, so there is at least some logic here.  One of the four emotions (pain at undeserved good 
fortune) is the same as to nemesan in the Rhet. (and nemesis in the NE). 
Page 11 of 20 
misfortune (spite) (EE 3.7.1233b19-25: ὁ µὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ’ 
ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἀνώνυµον, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν 
κακοπραγίαις. µέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεµεσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν 
νέµεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι µὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, 
χαίρειν δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις). 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, nemesis is again the mean, and thus a morally acceptable 
emotion, providing it is felt only when the object’s good fortune is undeserved 
(righteous indignation, the to nemesan of the Rhetoric; the other three good emotions 
are dropped from the definition).  Phthonos is once again identified with an excess of 
indignation, feeling pain even when good fortune is deserved (envy); and this time the 
defective vice, being so far short of pain that one feels joy (presumably at undeserved 
bad fortune), is named as epikhairekakia (spite) (NE 2.7.1108b1-5: νέµεσις δὲ 
µεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς 
συµβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινοµένας· ὁ µὲν γὰρ νεµεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς 
ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ 
δ’ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν).43  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle seems to have replaced four emotions identified in the 
Rhetoric with only three, having lost ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’, the second 
virtuous emotion.  However, let us look closer.  In suggesting that, in moving from 
indignation to envy, one moves from virtue to vice and ceases to concern oneself with 
desert, Aristotle is paralleling what he said in the Rhetoric, albeit in the language of 
his newly developed doctrine of the mean.
44
  It is by no means so obvious why spite 
should be the defective vice: one would expect the defect to be an inability to be 
indignant even when appropriate.
45
  Michael Mills notes that the triad envy – 
indignation – spite is the only one in the Ethics in which there are two excesses, and 
he has suggested that really there ought to be two triads, corresponding respectively to 
pain at good fortune and joy at bad fortune, as in Fig. 3. 
 
    phthoneros  -------  nemesêtikos  -------  anônumos 
       (envious)           (righteously indignant)           (unnamed) 
 
epikhairekakos  -------  anônumos  -------  anônumos 
         (spiteful)                       (unnamed)                   (unnamed) 
 
   Fig. 3:  Source: Mills 1985, 10 
 
The virtuous mean in each triad is the ability to diagnose desert correctly and feel an 
appropriate amount of pain or pleasure at it, while the excess in each triad is the lack 
of this ability coupled with feeling pain or pleasure indiscriminately.  Ignoring the 
deficient extremes, which are merely a lack of feeling, we can see in Fig. 4 that this 
formulation gives four emotions that are the envy, indignation, spite, and ‘pleasure at 
deserved misfortune’ (PaDM) of the Rhetoric: 
 
                                                 
43
 Envy and spite are not equivalent to other emotions treated in the ethical works, as they are not 
means that can be morally good in some measure, but are always vicious (NE 2.6.1107a9-12) – Mills 
1985, 10; Broadie 1991, 102; Garver 2000, 66. 
44
 I believe the development of this doctrine (and hence the composition of the ethical works) must 
postdate the Rhetoric, as Aristotle is very unlikely to have avoided all mention of it in the Rhetoric if 
that were a later work.  See Irwin (1996) 161-2 for a different view. 
45
 Grimaldi 1988, 152. 
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envy  -------  indignation  -------  apathy 
 
spite  -------  PaDM  -------  apathy 
 
   Fig. 4:  The “corrected” triads 
 
As Mills points out, Aristotle has tried to show how his “doctrine of the mean” covers 
rivalrous emotions but, perhaps led astray by so many unnamed emotions, he has 
mistakenly included one triad too few.
46
 
In the Rhetoric envy and spite were depicted as emotions that afflict bad people in 
certain situations.  In the Ethics they have become paradigms of badness: 
uncontrolled, excessive feelings by the ethically uneducated of emotions that an 
ethically aware person would feel more judiciously, and which in that judiciousness 
would be perfectly acceptable. 
 
 
4.  Who does, and does not, feel phthonos? 
 
4.1  Who feels envy, and when? 
 
Aristotle says that we feel envy for “those like ourselves” (2.10.1387b23-4:  ἐστὶν ὁ 
φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινοµένῃ τῶν εἰρηµένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς 
ὁµοίους).47  People will feel envy towards those who are or appear similar to them in 
birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth (2.10.1387b25-7: 
φθονήσουσι µὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσί τινες ὅµοιοι ἢ φαίνονται· ὁµοίους δὲ 
λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ 
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα), and near them in time, place, age and reputation (2.10.1388a6: τοῖς 
γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν).  Additionally 
people feel envy for kin (e.g. sibling rivalry) and anyone else they are in rivalry with, 
which will include people who are contemporaries, who live near them, who are not 
too far above or below them, and who compete for the same things both in sport and 
in love – and presumably occupation: he quotes the famous line from Hesiod that 
“potter envies potter” (2.10.1388a7-17).
48
 
People will feel envy when they fall a little short of having all the good things in life 
(2.10.1387b26).  People who do great deeds and have good fortune can also feel 
phthonos (possessive jealousy – see note 8 above), as they think others will try to take 
something away from them – this includes those honoured for a distinction, especially 
wisdom or happiness (29-30).  Ambitious people are more envious than unambitious 
ones (though this implies the unambitious can be envious too), as are those with a 
reputation for wisdom, who are ambitious as regards wisdom (possessive jealousy 
again).  In general, anyone wishing to be distinguished in anything can be envious (or 
                                                 
46
 Mills 1985, 10; see also Urmson 1980, 166-7; Konstan 2006, 115. 
47
 Referred to as τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁµοίου (“equal and similar”) at 2.9.1386b19-20.  The εἰρηµένων 
ἀγαθῶν (“goods already spoken about”) are given at 1.5.1360b18-22: good birth, plenty of friends, 
good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, bodily excellences (such as 
health, beauty, strength, height, athletic prowess), fame, honour, good luck, and virtue.  Aristotle says 
all these things are the product of good fortune, and as such incite envy (1.5.1362a5-6: ὅλως δὲ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος). 
48
 Hes. W&D 25:  καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ 
ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.  (“Potter grudges potter and carpenter, carpenter; beggar envies beggar and bard, 
bard.”) 
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jealous) in regard to that thing (31-33).  The small-minded (mikropsykhoi) are also 
envious, because everything seems great to them (34).  People envy those whose 
possessions or successes they feel to be a reproach to them (1388a18-21).  Those who 
have lost something, or who never had it, envy those that do have it, as do those who 
have not got it yet; this includes youth, so older men envy younger, and money, so 
those who have spent much envy those who have spent little (1388a21-24).
49
 
In reading the above, it can seem as if almost anyone can envy nearly anyone else for 
just about anything at all.  However, some situations exclude envy, even in the 
Rhetoric.  People who are not equal or similar in any of the ways listed will not feel 
envy for each other.  Even being dissimilar in only one respect can preclude envy: 
e.g. people who live a century apart, or at opposite ends of the Mediterranean, or those 
far above or below us (2.10.1388a9-12).  But for a more detailed analysis of those 
who will not feel envy, one must look to the Ethics, and in particular Aristotle’s 
discussion of virtue and ethical education. 
 
4.2  The elimination of a phaulotês 
 
We have already seen that morally good people cannot feel envy, but how does one 
become morally good?  Aristotle believes the human soul is divided into an alogical 
half and a logical half (NE 1.13.1102a26-32).  The alogical half is the passionate, 
desiderative part of the soul, the seat of the emotions and bodily desires.  However, 
since emotions are cognitive (i.e. they involve judgment), it is possible for them to be 
controlled by the logical half of the soul: the alogical half of the soul is (potentially) 
subordinate to the logical half.
50
  Ethics involves training both halves of the soul.  As 
Sarah Broadie notes: “human virtue, when achieved, is precisely an excellence of 
reason and feeling in partnership.”
51
  Training of the logical half of the soul aims at 
practical wisdom (phronêsis) (NE 6.5.1140b25-29).  Training of the alogical half aims 
at moral excellence (arête êthikê), which is brought about by the character (êthos) 
developing the habit (ethos) of acting in a certain way (NE 2.1.1103a14-17).
52
  One 
cannot truly have either moral excellence or practical wisdom without both being 
present (NE 6.13.1144b30-32). 
In order to eliminate envy and spite, one must habituate the alogical half of the soul, 
which feels emotions based on its training, only to feel pain or pleasure at someone’s 
perceived good or bad fortune when it ought to be felt.  This habituation is brought 
about by many influences: e.g. parental upbringing, the influence of society’s norms 
and laws, the scrutiny of peers.  By habituation one builds up a kind of mental 
database of situations in which one has been taught that indignation is a proper 
response, or that someone has “got their comeuppance” deservedly.  When someone 
so trained perceives an instance of good or bad fortune, his cognitive response will 
recognise this fortune and say “deserved” or “not deserved” correctly, causing him to 
feel (or not) pain or pleasure accordingly.  This ability is moral excellence, and is the 
                                                 
49
 There are some instructive contrasts with zêlos.  While the small-minded (mikropsykhoi) and the old 
are prone to phthonos (2.10.1387b, 2.10.1388a21), the high-minded (megalopsykhoi) and the young 
will feel emulation (2.11.1388a38-b3).  Both phthonos (2.10.1387b26) and zêlos (2.11.1388b3-7) can 
be felt for those who fall short of having all the goods in note 47 above; however the one must be felt 
by bad people, and the other by good.   
50
 Fortenbaugh 2002, 23-7. 
51
 Broadie 1991, 64. 
52
 ibid. 72; see also Kosman 1980.  Aristotle notes the close similarity in the Greek words 
(NE 2.1.1103a17-18); LSJ confirms êthos is a lengthened form of ethos. 
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William Fortenbaugh believes that perfecting the alogical part of the soul is sufficient: 
since deliberation is not necessary for every individual virtuous response (sometimes 
there isn’t sufficient time), practical wisdom is not necessary for a virtuous response 
to be guaranteed.
54
  Richard Sorabji rightly disagrees (see also NE 6.13.1144b30-32), 
but in my view goes too far in the other direction, arguing that deliberation (by the 
logical half of the soul) is required to find the mean in every instance of ethical 
emotional response.
55
  Fortenbaugh focuses too much on habituation, Sorabji too 
much on deliberation;
56
 the truth is somewhere between the two.  Aristotle makes 
plain that excellence is built through habituation: “we become just by doing just acts, 
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE 2.1.1103b1-2: 
οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ µὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόµεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 
σώφρονες, τὰ δ’ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι).57  A good upbringing should habituate one to be 
properly indignant but avoid envy, to feel proper pleasure at others’ misfortunes but 
avoid spite.  However, while someone with a good upbringing might hit on the 
morally correct response repeatedly, there is no guarantee that they will hit on it 
invariably, since for that to happen they must have true knowledge of where the mean 
lies, and that requires practical wisdom and deliberation. 
The man who has perfected both his moral excellence and his practical wisdom is 
megalopsykhos – the virtue is megalopsykhia
58
 – and such a man will not be able to 
feel envy.  Christopher Gill has argued that the megalopsykhos should not feel any of 
the rivalrous emotions covered by chapters 2.9-11, since he has a goodly measure of 
all appropriate goods and knows what he does not have is unimportant.
59
  However, 
while this might preclude emulation and disdain, and his virtue stops him feeling envy 
and spite, I see no reason why the megalopsykhos might not feel indignation or 
‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’.  Indeed, if he were unable to feel these, he would 
be practising the defective vice. 
One other context Gill identifies as precluding rivalrous emotions is (perfect) 
friendship:  a friend will only compete with his friend in virtue, and will willingly lose 
all his possessions, and his life itself if need be, for his friend’s sake.
60
  However, Gill 
does not show why a friend will not emulate his friend, and indeed Aristotle states 
that we will wish someone to be our friend if we want them to emulate but not envy 
us (2.4.1381b21-23: ὑφ’ ὧν ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ µὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ 
φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι). 
 
 
                                                 
53
 Smith 1996, 60 notes that, for Aristotle, education in habit must come before education in reason. 
54
 Fortenbaugh 2002, 73-5. 
55
 Sorabji 1980, 211. 
56
 Smith 1996 argues that Fortenbaugh takes a Humean approach, pitting himself against the 
“intellectualists”, each side stressing either character or intellect has priority in “determining good 
moral ends” (58). 
57
 Trans. Barnes 1984, 1743. 
58
 Megalopsykhos is normally translated “magnanimous” (Barnes  1984 uses “properly proud”), while 
megalopsykhia is “magnanimity”.  In note 49 above I translated it “high-minded”, to highlight the 
comparison with “small-minded” (mikropsykhos). 
59
 Gill 2003, 36-7. 
60
 ibid; this might suggest a “zero sum” element to rivalry, which I do not believe Aristotle intends. 
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5.  Envy and the Aristotelian orator 
 
5.1  Can an orator rouse his audience’s envy? 
 
Those with sufficient virtue never to feel envy (megalopsykhoi and perfect friends) 
are clearly few and far between, and accordingly the vast majority of an orator’s 
listeners will be susceptible to envy.  However, the morally bad nature of phthonos 
raises problems that do not apply to other emotions. 
Emotion arousal is useful as an oratorical tool because emotions, by application of 
pain or pleasure through rational argument, affect judgment.  In an insightful article, 
Stephen Leighton has discussed exactly how judgment can be affected by emotion:
61
 
it will either be as the consequence of emotion, or as a constituent of emotion.  
Judgement alteration as a consequence of emotion can come about in four ways.  The 
first is by allowing our reason to be overruled (e.g. if we pity someone, we let them 
off for a crime we know they have committed).  Secondly, if we can be brought to 
favour or disfavour someone, we will be better or worse disposed towards giving 
them the benefit of the doubt when the situation is ambiguous.  Thirdly, through 
perception: for instance, our strong support for one of two tennis players will affect 
whether we judge a ball she hit to be in or out.  The final way is through strong 
emotion causing us to give more attention to an issue.  Alteration of judgment as a 
constituent of emotion is more complex.  It is not that one emotion rules out another, 
rather that the “emotions are complexes involving judgments, each complex excluding 
certain other emotion complexes, their judgments, and certain other judgments as 
well.”
62
  Aristotle gives one, and only one, effect of envy: he says that if an orator can 
put the jury into an envious state of mind, then his opponent will not be able to win 
pity from them (see note 20 above).  In Leighton’s words: “It is not that envy brings 
about a change of judgments such that one does not show or feel pity; rather, to be 




But can an Aristotelian orator make use of this?  Another of the three modes of 
persuasion is character (êthos):  an orator must make his argument in a way that 
makes him appear worthy of trust, and it is good men that we trust; a good man’s 
character is demonstrated by what he says, and it is pretty much the most effective 
means of persuasion available to him (1.2.1356a4-13: διὰ µὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν 
οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι 
πιστεύοµεν µᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον….  δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συµβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου… 
σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος).  However, since envy is a bad 
(phaulon) emotion, if an orator presents himself as envious of his opponent in trying 
to rouse similar envy in his audience, he will show his own character to be base.  If 
his character is “pretty much the most effective means of persuasion” available to 
him, using envy is not worth that sacrifice.  Second, he cannot present himself as not 
envious, but still explicitly attempt to rouse envy in his audience: they will either 
believe he shares that envy, or that he does not and is merely spinning sophisms.  
Worse, by appearing to impute bad character to his audience, he may alienate them. 
A third, and more complex, possibility is that the orator might seek to rouse envy in 
the audience while seeming not to.  However, I do not believe this is possible either.  
First, the audience might spot it, which leads to the problems already mentioned.  A 
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more serious objection is that, although rhetoric (like dialectic) is a skill that can be 
used to argue anything, an Aristotelian student must pursue a life of moral excellence 
and practical wisdom, and politics is an extension of this ethical life;
64
 accordingly an 
Aristotelian orator must not use unethical arguments, even if they might be 
rhetorically effective.
65
  A fourth explanation also fails: Aristotle cannot be instructing 
his orator how to deal with envy if it is used against him,
66
 because he does not tell 
him how to counter envy, only that envy can be used to counter pity (2.10.1388a27-
30).
67
  There are therefore problems with any use the orator might wish to make of 
envy within the purposes of chapter 2.1 – i.e. arousing it in an audience to affect their 
judgement. 
So what use can an Aristotelian orator make of the chapter on envy?  Well, first, this 
chapter has didactic purpose: if there were no discussion of what envy is and how it 
differs from indignation and emulation, how could an Aristotelian orator avoid 
straying from these acceptable emotions to envy?  This, I believe, is why Aristotle 
devotes so much space to telling his orator exactly how one distinguishes these 
emotions from each other, and why he makes such a point of saying how acceptable 
and worthy indignation and emulation are, when envy is so immoral.  If envy did not 
exist, Aristotle would have had to invent it. 
 
5.2  Envy in an orator’s opponent 
 
However, there is something more an Aristotelian student might extract from the 
Rhetoric.  There is a second type of rhetorical use for the emotions, more acceptable 
for envy than manipulating an audience, and this is to explain one’s opponent’s 
motivation (1.10.1369a15-19).
68
  Prosecutors must consider all the motives that can 
affect defendants, and how many apply to their opponent, while defendants must 
consider how many do not apply to them (1.10.1368b30-32). 
Aristotle argues (1.10.1368b33-1369a6) that all of a person’s actions are caused 
either by the person himself (di’ autous), or something external to him.  The latter 
comprises things done out of chance or necessity (which itself subdivides into 
compulsion and nature); the former out of habit or desire (orexin).  Desire subdivides 
into rational desire, or will (boulêsis), and irrational desire, which further subdivides 
into appetite (epithymia) and anger (orgê).
69
  In fitting the emotions into these, it 
would seem that at least all pleasurable emotions are subsumed within appetite: 
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 Schofield 2006. 
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 Hesk 2000, 219 says Aristotle believes that rhetoric without moral purpose is merely sophistry. 
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 It should be noted that Aristotle does not say phthonos should be used in this way (let alone only in 
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appetite is a desire for pleasure (1.11.1370a18: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυµία τοῦ ἡδέος ἐστὶν 
ὄρεξις).  For painful emotions, it is helpful if we recall that anger (orgê) is a pain 
accompanied by a desire for revenge, and that revenge brings pleasure (2.2.1378a30-
1878b2).  In fact in general, painful emotions are accompanied by a desire to escape 
from pain, and that desire will be pleasant (1.10.1369b26-28): hatred is attended by a 
desire to harm,
70
 pity by a desire to aid, envy by a desire to bring low, emulation by a 
desire to succeed.  Thus pleasant feelings are aroused by a desire to act in certain 
ways, and painful feelings by a desire to act in other ways.
71
 
This then is the second use an Aristotelian orator can make of the emotions, and, if the 
first use is ruled out of court, the only use he can make of envy: he can show that his 
opponent is motivated by it.  Either the defendant committed whatever action he 
committed out of envy in the past, or the prosecutor is prosecuting the defendant out 
of envy now.  We have seen that Aristotle compels the speaker and the audience to 
remain untainted by the badness of phthonos.  If the opponent can be shown to be 
motivated by it, he will therefore be the most evil person in the court.  The speaker 
should win his case by default. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown that phthonos is not just one of many emotions similarly 
treated by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, but in fact stands apart from the others because of 
its badness.  Building on work by Ben-Ze’ev, I have proposed a schema for 
understanding how Aristotle systematises the family of emotions relating to the 
fortunes of others.  In that schema, it is explicitly badness that distinguishes phthonos 
from zêlos, and a consequence of the badness (being unable to diagnose people’s just 
deserts) that distinguishes phthonos from to nemesan.  In the Ethics, Aristotle 
continues to distinguish bad phthonos from good nemesis (as he calls it there), but 
now phthonos is not a different emotion to nemesis, but the same emotion when felt in 
excess by the ethically uneducated.  Following a brief look at the situations that 
arouse phthonos, I have shown how, through habituating the alogical half of the soul 
to feel only appropriate indignation and through teaching the logical half of the soul 
practical wisdom as to justified deserts, one might aspire to be megalopsykhos, when 
one is no longer susceptible to feeling phthonos (i.e. excessive nemesis).  Returning to 
the Rhetoric, I have shown how the badness of phthonos renders it unsuitable in every 
way for direct use in persuading an audience, Aristotle’s stated aim – though it can be 
used to explain an opponent’s motivation.  An orator can also use the chapter to 
distinguish phthonos clearly from nemesis and zêlos, thus determining to what extent 
he can use the latter two emotions to persuade an audience, without damaging his own 
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 Strictly, Aristotle says that hatred, unlike anger, is not painful (2.4.1382a12-13); see Cooper 1996, 
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